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Political settlements and pacts now feature prominently 
in donor narratives about transitions from conflict and 
institutional fragility to peace and prosperity (Hickey 
2013). Ten years after the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention, political 
settlement analysis offers fresh perspective on core 
questions: Are governing arrangements in Solomon 
Islands stable and sustainable? Where might they be 
ineffective and vulnerable?
Following Khan, ‘political settlement’ describes 
the underlying or emerging ‘social order based on 
political compromises between powerful groups in 
society that sets the context for institutional and other 
policies … more precisely [it is] a combination of 
power and institutions that is mutually compatible and 
also sustainable in terms of economic and political 
viability’ (2010:4, our emphasis). Post-conflict political 
settlements, their compromises and combinations can 
develop out of ‘pacts’ between political and economic 
elites that, as they become institutionalised, provide a 
durable kind of stability and order (Craig and Porter in 
press). Two factors that determine the scope and depth 
of the settlement are the ‘grasp’ and ‘reach’ of the pacts 
and of the institutions that grow from them (Mann 
1988). ‘Grasp’ refers to the ability of the pact to pull 
together powerful interests, often centrally, and then 
to clasp together the resources needed to govern via 
institutions: especially political power and economic 
rents. ‘Reach’ refers to the ability of central actors and 
institutions to project power and resources out to places 
where people live, including them in the settlement by 
delivering services, livelihoods and other opportunities. 
Pacts can have a powerful grasp (making them stable, 
short term) but a weak reach (making them less 
inclusive, and perhaps less stable longer term).
Different kinds of pacts take different pathways, 
and produce different sets of institutional strengths 
and weaknesses. Slater (2010), considering long-
term political stability and settlement in South-East 
Asian countries, describes two forms of pacts and two 
different pathways: ‘protection’ and ‘provisioning’ pacts. 
‘Protection pacts’ are heavy on central grasp, and have 
produced durable (though authoritarian) stability. They 
are created (centrally) when political and economic elites 
respond to threats from communal, urban, class-based 
violence, pact together and contribute economic rents 
to make formal state and political structures work. By 
contrast, ‘provisioning pacts’ are less focused on central 
grasp or local reach, and more on holding the pact 
together, short term. They are made when political elites 
need to secure support from others by providing them 
with a share of rents and resources. This puts the central 
state’s resources directly into the hands of political actors 
who might or might not use these resources to extend 
the state’s reach through effective machineries delivering 
services. Provisioning pacts could result in powerful 
reach through strong resourcing; but more often they 
result in unsustainable spending, and can corrode 
and exhaust both the grasp and reach of state systems. 
According to Slater, this leads to either fragmentation or 
militarisation (armed groups in control).
In terms of Slater’s discussion of protection versus 
provisioning pacts, Solomon Islands’ pacts (and the 
settlements emerging from them) demonstrate some 
aspects of protection. The RAMSI security intervention 
suppressed central, urban communal violence and led 
to a consolidation of central powers and rents, albeit 
one driven more by external actors than by local ones. 
Business elites seeking protection contribute powerfully 
to a form of central pact formation, funding it directly 
and off budget. In Solomon Islands, as internationally, 
experience is that economic actors make what Tilly 
(2005) calls ‘clientage payments’ to political actors in 
exchange for protection and provision — including 
concessions. In Solomon Islands, resource (especially 
timber) rents and concessions, but also import and other 
tax concessions, have been crucial sources of clientage 
money, received by individual actors at the expense of 
national revenues. And this money is recycled quite 
directly into formation of coalitions and pacts.
There are, however, structural difficulties in 
achieving durable, protection-oriented compromises and 
combinations between Solomon Islands political and 
economic elites. There, economic elites face the challenge 
of institutionalising their influence across an ethnic 
cleavage. In other nation settings, pacts between elite 
political and business groups are consolidated variously: 
business families entering politics, intermarriage, routine 
contributions by business to stable political parties. But 
in Solomon Islands, arrangements for forging pacts 
seem especially one dimensional — involving money, 
channelled into direct personal allegiance. Especially 
after elections and before confidence votes, clientage 
payments enable a whole informal machinery of short-
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(Allen 2011), and either enables grasp and reach, or gets 
‘provisioned’ away. Effective protection and provisioning 
by donors matters too, especially if it provides for 
urban development and enables access to international 
labour markets. But donors must be more alert to how 
their provisionings affect incentives for politicians to 
invest in central grasping (via fewer concessions) and 
local provisioning reach, rather than leaving this to 
co-production in central ministries, donor programs and 
unreliable CDFs.
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term pacts among political actors. This form of ‘grasping’ 
and ‘reaching’ takes money out of the formal provisioning 
and policy-based electoral claims making. The political 
pacts it enables are corrosive in their policy influence 
and inherently unstable, even though familiar faces 
reappear over time. There are also questions about the 
sustainability of revenues, as timber rents, both formal 
and informal, are projected to decline.
Overall in the Solomons case, ‘provisioning’ 
remains the most important driver of pact formation. 
Solomon Islands faces extreme challenges and demands 
in provisioning. Challenges include the provisioning 
of services to geographically dispersed communities, 
which is difficult and expensive; local demand for public 
services is rarely met. Provisioning demands include 
private concessions (e.g. tax breaks), which undermine 
central grasp. Politicians demand funds for direct 
provisioning of their local supporters and projects. 
Whether by granting concessions or joining pacts to 
access provisioning money, national politicians are 
preoccupied with getting a share of the rents concentrated 
in Honiara to take home. These short-term goals 
focused on provisioning undermine the formation of 
stable political parties to contest elections and distribute 
rents on a policy, not patronage basis (Corbett and 
Woods 2013).
Recently, direct, short-term and questionably 
sustainable provisioning has become much more 
important to pact formation and institution building. 
Politicians have expanded constituency development 
funds (CDFs) — amounting to around 15 per cent of 
total budget outlays — and tertiary scholarships. These 
funds ‘grasp’ resources out of mainstream line ministry 
budgets and into provisioning arrangements with 
national members of parliament who insist they are better 
placed to ‘reach’ down to provision local communities. 
But CDFs have put significant pressure on the budget, 
and are likely to undermine fiscal discipline and override 
other priorities (IMF 2013).
Will Solomon Islands pacts institutionalise 
fundamentally unstable, unsustainable provisioning 
arrangements? Could the CDF grasp and reach 
arrangements be gradually folded into mainstream state 
mechanisms, which can shape a sustainable political 
settlement? It seems possible that together, the various 
‘layers’ of provisioning arrangements, including those 
propped up by international co-production arrangements 
(security, justice, education, health) may be enough to 
avoid relapse into violent conflict. Much will depend 
on whether a shift from logging to mining rents occurs 
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